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International Norms and Canadian 
Treaties 
Shin Imai
1
 
In 2007, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
validated the necessity of obtaining free, prior, and informed consent before instituting 
significant extractive industry projects on Indigenous lands. The most surprising 
development since the declaration’s adoption is the take-up of the standard by non-state 
private sector actors. International institutions such as the International Finance 
Corporation of the World Bank, the financial institutions that have adopted the Equator 
Principles, and the International Council on Mining and Metals have published policies 
accepting the necessity of obtaining free, prior, informed consent. In Canada, private 
sector actors have also recognized the consent standard, including the Prospectors and 
Developers Association of Canada and a grouping of industry, financial institutions, and 
                                                          
1
 I would like to thank Sally Kang for research assistance and Kent McNeil Jesse 
McCormick and Jim Reynolds for making suggestions on the text. 
   2 
 
First Nation organizations called the Boreal Forest Initiative. Obviously, adopting some 
version of the consent standard makes practical and financial sense to the industry. 
The courts in Canada have dealt with extractive projects on traditional Indigenous 
land using a different framework. Rather than requiring consent, Canadian courts require 
that the Crown consult and accommodate the interests of Indigenous groups. Where 
treaty rights or Aboriginal rights are infringed, the courts require that the Crown justify 
the infringement through a test developed in R. v Sparrow, which will be described in 
part two. Judges have said repeatedly that Indigenous groups in Canada do not have a 
“veto” over development. 
In this chapter I will look at the international consent standard with a view to 
developing a conceptual framework for its adoption in interpreting the “numbered 
treaties.” Eleven such treaties were signed between 1871 and 1929, and they cover a great 
deal of our country, spanning First Nation territories from Ontario to parts of British 
Columbia and north to the Northwest Territories. These treaties provide for the creation 
of small reserves for the Indians and the “surrender” of the remaining tracts of land to the 
Crown. The land that is “surrendered” continues to be available for Indigenous hunting, 
fishing, and harvesting activities. However, once the land is “taken up” by the provincial 
Crown for activities such as mining, lumbering, and settlement, the treaty rights to hunt, 
fish, and harvest are suppressed. I will argue that the provincial Crown does not have a 
unilateral right to “take up” lands; rather, the Crown should obtain the consent of the First 
Nations concerned before authorizing extractive activity on traditional territories. 
In the argument that follows, I refer to documents created at the international 
level. However, I do not use these in the same way as my colleague Sara Seck. In her 
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chapter, she places these instruments in a transnational governance context and looks at 
the treaties between First Nations and the Crown in the international sphere. By contrast, 
I am looking at how to use these international instruments can be used by courts in 
Canada to benchmark Crown and private company conduct in relation to the use of 
traditional Indigenous territory. My argument is not that the international instruments are 
binding or persuasive qua international law but rather that they are evidence of best 
practices in industry that should be incorporated into the development of the common law 
here. Sara Seck’s approach and my approach are different but complementary. 
1. Consent and the “Numbered Treaties” 
The Crown entered into the numbered treaties with Indigenous peoples in order to 
ensure peace and goodwill with settlers who wished to enter the “tract of country” 
inhabited by the Indians. The treaties clearly state that the objective was “to obtain 
consent” of the Indians.2 The necessary implication is that the Crown recognized that 
there was an Indigenous party to the treaty that could, through internal deliberations, 
decide to give – or withhold – consent. The three elements of the legal framework at the 
time, then, was that there was an Indigenous collectivity, that it had an interest in the 
land, and that consent of that collectivity was necessary in order for the Crown to access 
their territory.
3
 
                                                          
2
 The James Bay Treaty – Treaty No. 9 (Made in 1905 and 1906) and Adhesions 
Made in 1929 and 1930 (1931; repr., Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of 
Stationery, 1964), at  http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028863/1100100028864#chp5 
3
 I am not implying that the legal framework corresponded to the actual practice 
on the ground. For a general discussion of problems with treaty implementation, see 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol. 1 of the  
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 Unfortunately, as the treaties were being rolled out between 1871 and 1929, 
Canada entered into a century-long Dark Ages in its relations with Indigenous peoples. 
Through the policy of assimilation, legislation was drafted that legalized the theft of 
regalia, the destruction of totem poles, the forbidding of ceremonies, the taking of 
children to residential schools, and the appropriation of Indigenous lands. During this 
period, the legal framework for treaties and its foundation on consent were ignored. The 
prevailing attitude was articulated in 1929 by a judge in Nova Scotia who found that a 
1752 treaty between the British and the Mi’kmaq was not enforceable. 
A civilized nation first discovering a country of uncivilized people or savages 
held such country as its own until such time as by treaty it was transferred to some 
other civilized nation. The savages’ rights of sovereignty, even of ownership, 
were never recognized. Nova Scotia had passed to Great Britain not by gift or 
purchase from, or even by conquest of, the Indians but by treaty with France, 
which had acquired it by priority of discovery and ancient possession; and the 
Indians passed with it.4 
So instead of Indigenous nations capable of making treaties, there was a new legal 
framework based on “savages” who were not capable of land ownership and therefore 
had nothing to give consent to. It is based on this legal framework that Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau released his White Paper on Indian Policy in 1969.
5
 He proposed to 
convert reserves into private property and get rid of Indian status, thereby removing legal 
space for Indigenous collectivities and Indigenous lands. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Final Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Supply and 
Services Canada, 1996) at 176–9. 
4
 R. v Syliboy, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307 (N.S. Co. Ct.). 
5
 Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the 
Government of Canada on Indian Policy (The White Paper,1969) (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 1969),  http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100010189/1100100010191 
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2. Consultation, Accommodation, and Veto 
A powerful blowback from First Nations against the White Paper policy, and a 
Supreme Court of Canada decision in 1973 that opened the possibility of Aboriginal 
title,
6
 started to roll back this policy of legal annihilation. Judicial recognition of 
Indigenous peoples was propelled by the enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada 
are hereby recognized and affirmed.”7 
In 1985 the Supreme Court of Canada said that Canada should honour the 
promises made by the Crown in the written versions of the treaties,
8
 then went further in 
1999 to reinterpret the written versions of a treaty to take into account Indigenous 
perspectives.
9
 In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada turned its attention to the 
interpretation of one of the most important clauses in the numbered treaties, and the 
clause that is central to the argument in this chapter: 
 
And Her Majesty the Queen HEREBY AGREES with the said Indians that they 
shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing 
throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore described, subject to such 
regulations as may from time to time be made by the Government of the country, 
acting under the authority of Her Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as 
may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, 
trading or other purposes.
10
 
                                                          
6
 Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] SCR 313. 
7
 Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982 c. 11. 
8
 R. v Simon, [1985] 2 SCR 387. 
9
 R. v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456. 
10
 Treaty No. 8 Made June 21, 1899 and Adhesions, Reports, Etc. (1899; repr., 
Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1966), at http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028813/1100100028853#chp4. 
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In Mikisew Cree Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),
11
 the 
Canadian government approved the construction of a winter road through the Wood 
Buffalo National Park which would cross the trap lines of over a dozen families who 
resided near the proposed road, and would affect up to 100 Cree hunters. The First Nation 
argued that the road infringed its hunting and fishing rights under Treaty No. 8 and relied 
on the part of the clause that said that Indians could “pursue their usual vocations of 
hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered.” 
The Crown, on the other hand, relied on a different part of the same clause – the 
part that says that lands could be “taken up” for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or 
other purposes. They argued that the text of the treaty did not say that the Crown needed 
to ask permission to take up the lands and did not put any limits on how much land could 
be taken up. Therefore, Indians had the right to hunt and fish only until the Crown 
exercised its unilateral right to take up the lands.  
The Court did not accept the Crown’s interpretation of the clause. Rather, the 
Court incorporated Aboriginal understandings and found that the Crown did not have an 
unlimited, unilateral right to take up lands.  This approach brought the Court to look at 
how the lands taken up clause would evolve over time, and divided the taking up of land 
into two stages. At the first stage, only consultation and accommodation would be 
required for taking up lands.
12
 At the second stage, when so much land was taken up that 
“no meaningful right to hunt exists over its traditional territories,”13 the Crown would 
                                                          
11
 Mikisew Cree Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 SCR 
388. 
12
 Ibid, para 55. 
13
 Ibid , para 48. See also, Keewatin v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48, 
para 52. 
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have to do more than consult: it would have to justify its actions using the test developed 
in R. v Sparrow in 1990.
14
 
The “Sparrow test” came to be when Ronald Sparrow went fishing for food in an 
area traditionally used by his First Nation. He was charged under the federal Fisheries 
Act for using a net that was longer than that permitted by fisheries regulations. The 
Supreme Court of Canada found that the regulation could not be permitted to interfere 
with Sparrow’s Aboriginal right to fish for food and ceremonial purposes. In the course 
of the decision, the Court set out the connection between Aboriginal rights and Crown 
regulation in a two-part test. First, if the Crown law infringed an existing Aboriginal 
right, the law would have to have a “compelling and substantial purpose.” The example 
used in Sparrow for an appropriate law would be a regulation aimed at conservation of a 
resources used by the First Nation.  Second, the Crown needed to act honourably and 
justify the infringement by consulting with the First Nation about the legislation, 
infringing the Aboriginal right as little as possible and, where appropriate, providing 
compensation.  
This “infringe-and-justify” framework has been applied in hundreds of cases 
dealing with the numbered treaties at various levels of court and  has resulted in limiting 
the area of land available to exercise treaty hunting, trapping and fishing rights.  In the 
legal framework as articulated in Mikisew Cree and Sparrow there is a right to be 
consulted, but the role of consent is not developed, as we will see in later in this chapter. 
Having dealt with “consultation” I next address the origin of the concepts of  
“accommodation” and “no veto”.   In this chapter, I am talking about rights enshrined in 
                                                          
14
 R. v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075. 
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historical treaties that embody an agreement between the Crown and the First Nation.  
However, there has been a parallel development of law in regions of Canada where 
treaties were never signed, and First Nations assert inherent Aboriginal rights to land.  
Given the length of time to prove the existence of Aboriginal rights to land in court, 
Indigenous people argued that they needed to halt development in the interim. The Crown 
responded that until a court had decided on the existence of Aboriginal title, the Crown 
could continue resource development.   In  Haida Nation v. British Columbia,
15
 the 
Supreme  Court of Canada  rejected the Crown’s argument and found that in such cases  
the Crown had a duty to “consult and accommodate”. There have been hundreds of cases 
based on Haida Nation. To summarize broadly, the cases say that the Crown must engage 
with Indigenous groups and try to address concerns that they raise. Indigenous parties 
must participate in the process and exchange information. Whether the process of 
consultation and the substantive accommodations proposed by the Crown or project 
proponents is sufficient to meet the legal standard is up to the courts. If a court finds that 
the Crown has met the standard to consult and accommodate, then the project can 
proceed. If the standard is not met, the Court may impose conditions or may require 
further consultation and accommodation. Many of these cases mention that the First 
Nation does not have a veto.
16
 In this context, “no veto” means that the final decision on 
whether the project proceeds does not lie in the hands of the Indigenous group, but rather 
in the hands of the Court. To look at the issue from the Crown or project proponent 
perspective, the fact that Indigenous groups have “no veto” does not mean that the project 
                                                          
 
15
 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73. 
16
 For example, see Behn v Moulton, Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, para 29. 
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will necessary go ahead. The Court will determine whether the procedural and 
substantive standards have been met. 
I will return to the discussion of “no veto” in the next section, where I discuss the 
relationship between the concept of veto and the concept of consent. 
3. Consent, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples and Voluntary Industry Codes 
At the international level, developments on relations between states and 
Indigenous peoples began with an assimilationist approach evident in the Indigenous and 
Tribal Populations Convention (“ILO 107”) of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), adopted in 1957.
17
 ILO 107 was aimed at “integration” of Indigenous people into 
the majority population, and focused on individual equality rights rather than rights of the 
collectivity. By the mid-1980s, it became clear that Indigenous peoples themselves did 
not favour such an approach, and the ILO drafted another convention, ILO 169, named 
the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989.
18
 The change from “populations” to 
“peoples” signaled a change in direction: explicitly recognizing the existence of 
                                                          
17
 International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Populations 
Convention, 1957 (No. 107), at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTR
UMENT_ID:312252. The ILO is a specialized body of the United Nations, made up of 
representatives of workers, employers, and governments. It was the first organization to 
have an instrument directed specifically at Indigenous people. 
18
 International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
1989 (No. 169), at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_I
NSTRUMENT_ID:312314:NO. The requirement to consult in ILO 169 came a year 
before the Supreme Court of Canada released R. v Sparrow, which said that consultation 
was necessary before infringing Aboriginal rights. Canada has not signed ILO 169, so it 
has no legal applicability in Canada.  
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Indigenous collectivities. ILO 169 went further, requiring that Indigenous people be 
consulted about resource development on their lands: 
 
[G]overnments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall 
consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree 
their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any 
programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to 
their lands.
19
 
The growing international movement for Indigenous rights, led by Indigenous 
people, resulted in the enactment of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People in 2007 (UNDRIP).
20
 This declaration recognized the right of 
Indigenous peoples to self-determination, the preservation of their cultures, and rights to 
land in their territories. The provision that is most relevant for this chapter is found in 
Article 32, which provides that Indigenous people must give their free prior and informed 
consent (FPIC): 
 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their 
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands 
or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
21
 
The Government of Canada’s reaction to these provisions was baffling. Canada 
was one of only four countries in the world to vote against the adoption of UNDRIP in 
2007, and in 2014 at the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, when every nation in 
the General Assembly endorsed the principles of UNDRIP, Canada stood alone to raise 
                                                          
19
 Ibid, Article 15.2. 
20
 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNDRIP] 
UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007), at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf 
21
 Ibid, Article 32. 
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an objection to the consent standard, because in its view, requiring consent would mean 
that Indigenous people would have a veto over projects on their traditional lands.
22
 
The Government of Canada was sharply out of step with international 
developments and even domestic developments in the private sector.
23
 In the sections 
below, I outline the adoption of some sort of consent standard by a number of 
international and Canadian institutions to illustrate the depth and diversity of support for 
FPIC. 
24
 
A. The International Finance Corporation 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in 1956 to offer 
investment, advisory, and asset management services with the aim of encouraging private 
sector development in developing countries. A member of the World Bank Group 
headquartered in Washington, D.C., the IFC is owned, and its policies are determined by, 
                                                          
22
 Canada’s Statement on the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples Outcome 
Document” (New York, 22 September 2014), at 
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/statements-
declarations/other-autres/2014-09-22_WCIPD-PADD.aspx?lang=eng 
 
23
 In October, 2015, a new Liberal government under Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau came into power and promised to create more positive policies for Indigenous 
peoples. At the time of writing, there has not been any clear statement on whether the 
new government will accept the consent standard.  
24
 I am not providing an exhaustive list of relevant instruments, some of which do 
not mention free, prior, informed consent. For example, the Organization for Economic 
and Cooperative Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises have not been 
updated since 2011 and do not set out any standards specifically for Indigenous peoples. 
See http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/. As well, I am not going to focus on different 
iterations of the consent standard or address the effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of 
the voluntary standards themselves. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework for 
incorporating consent into the implementation of treaties and is not meant to be an 
analysis of the standards themselves. For an overall review and critique of these 
voluntary standards, see Penelope Simons and Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap 
(London: Routledge, 2014). 
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its 184 member countries. Its current work in over 100 developing countries is meant to 
create jobs, generate tax revenues, improve corporate governance, and improve 
environmental performance by providing loans to private sector companies active in 
emerging markets.
25
 
The IFC has published performance standards that loan recipients must follow. 
These standards provide guidance on how to identify and manage risks and impacts. 
Performance Standard 7 requires that IFC clients identify adverse impacts on affected 
Indigenous communities and develop action plans to address these impacts with the 
participation of those communities. The 2006 version of the performance standards 
mentioned “free, prior, informed consultation” with Indigenous peoples, but the 2012 
version requires free, prior and informed consent.
26
 
According to the IFC, the client company must procure FPIC through good-faith 
negotiation with the affected Indigenous community as well as document (1) the mutually 
accepted process between the parties for obtaining consent, and (2) evidence of 
agreement between the parties on the outcome of the negotiations.
27
 The performance 
standard also directs companies to involve Indigenous peoples’ representative bodies and 
members of the affected communities, including vulnerable groups such as women and 
youth, and to provide sufficient time for decision-making.
28
 
                                                          
25
 International Finance Corporation (IFC), “About IFC: Overview,” at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about
+ifc 
26
 International Finance Corporation (IFC), “Performance Standard 7: Indigenous 
Peoples,” at 
http:/www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a79139b845faa8c6a8312a/PS7_English
_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
27
 Ibid, para 12. 
28
 Ibid, para 18. 
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B. The Equator Principles 
The Equator Principles provide a risk management framework for determining, 
evaluating, and managing environmental and social risk in projects. They primarily 
function to “provide a minimum standard for due diligence to support responsible risk 
decision-making”29 and are designed to assist member institutions in their decisions to 
disburse loans to finance particular projects. Member institutions commit to 
implementing and honouring the Equator Principles within their internal environmental 
and social policies, procedures, and standards for financing projects and must not provide 
project financing or project-related corporate loans where the client/project either will not 
or cannot comply with the Principles. 
The establishment of the Equator Principles has brought social/community 
standards and responsibility – such as those regarding Indigenous peoples, 
labour/employment, and consultation with affected local communities – to the forefront 
within the project finance market. In doing so, they have helped rally support for the 
convergence and consensus around common environmental and social standards. For 
instance, multilateral development banks and export credit agencies are increasingly 
drawing on and applying the same standards as the Equator Principles.
30
 
Currently, there are eighty-four members in thirty-five countries. They are among 
the most important financial institutions in the world, including Banco Santander, Bank 
of America, JP Morgan Bank, Barclays, and all five of the major banks in Canada. These 
                                                          
29
 Equator Principles, “About the Equator Principles,” at http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/ep3/ep3/38-about/about/195 
30
 Ibid. 
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institutions cover more than 70 per cent of international project finance debt in emerging 
markets.
31
 
The requirement for “free, prior, informed consent” was instituted in 2013 in 
“Equator Principles III,” a change from the preceding requirement for “free, prior, 
informed consultation” found in “Equator Principles II.”32 
C. The International Council on Mining and Metals 
The International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM) was established in 2001 
to improve sustainable development performance in the mining and metals industry. It 
brings together twenty-two mining and metals companies, as well as thirty-three national 
and regional mining associations and global commodity associations, to address core 
sustainable development challenges.
33
 Canadian members are Barrick Gold, Goldcorp, 
Teck, the Mining Association of Canada, and the Prospectors and Developers 
Association of Canada. 
The council’s May 2013 position statement, “Indigenous Peoples and Mining,” 
explicitly requires its member companies to “work to obtain the consent of indigenous 
communities for new projects (and changes to existing projects) that are located on lands 
traditionally owned by or under customary use of Indigenous Peoples and are likely to 
                                                          
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Equator Principles, “The Equator Principles III – 2013,” at http://www.equator-
rinciples.com/index.php/ep3. 
33
 International Council on Mining and Metals, “About Us,” at 
http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us 
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have significant adverse impacts on Indigenous Peoples.”34 This is a significant shift 
from the prior position, which required only consultation.
35
   
D. Akwé: Kon Guidelines 
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity came into force in 
December 1993. It promotes “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use 
of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of 
genetic resources.”36 One part of the Convention addresses traditional knowledge of 
Indigenous people. In order to ensure that traditional knowledge was included in cultural, 
environmental, and social impact assessments, the members of the Convention developed 
the Akwé: Kon Guidelines in 2012. These guidelines state that consultations with 
Indigenous groups should include a way for the local and Indigenous communities to 
“have the option to accept or oppose a proposed development that may impact on their 
community.”37 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 International Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM), “Indigenous Peoples and 
Mining: Position Statement” (May 2013), at http://www.icmm.com/document/5433 
35
 Sarah A. Altschuller, “ICMM Releases Position Statement on Indigenous 
Peoples Establishing Commitment to FPIC,” Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Law (30 May 2013), at http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2013/05/30/icmm-releases-
position-statement-on-indigenous-peoples-establishing-commitment-to-fpic/ 
36
 Convention on Biological Diversity, “History of the Convention,” at 
https://www.cbd.int/history/. 
37
 Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8(e) in “Akwé: Kon Guidelines,” at 
https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-brochure-en.pdf. 
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E. The Boreal Leadership Council 
The purpose of this Canadian organization is to establish “a network of large 
interconnected protected areas covering about half of the country’s Boreal Forest and the 
use of leading-edge sustainable development practices in remaining areas.”38 The 
seventeen members of the Canadian Boreal Leadership Council come from the finance 
sector, Indigenous groups, non-governmental organizations, and the forestry industry.
39
 
The council believes that the development of the boreal forest requires the free, 
prior, informed consent of the Indigenous peoples concerned. In September 2012, the 
council released “Free Prior Informed Consent in Canada,” a guidebook that provides 
information on best practices for implementing FPIC.
40
 and in 2015 the Council 
reinforced this policy in “Understanding Successful Approaches to Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consent in Canada”41 
F. Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada 
The Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC) is the largest 
mining body in Canada, with more than 1,200 corporate and 9,000 individual members. It 
published e3 Plus – A Framework for Responsible Exploration in order to help resource 
exploration companies improve their social, environmental, health, and safety 
                                                          
38
 Boreal Leadership Council, at http://borealcouncil.ca/. 
39
 Boreal Leadership Council, “Members,” at http://borealcouncil.ca/members/. 
40
 Boreal Leadership Council, “Free Prior Informed Consent in Canada,” 
September 2012, at http://www.borealcanada.ca/documents/FPICReport-English-web.pdf 
 
41
 Boreal Leadership Council,  “Understanding Successful Approaches to Free, 
Prior, and Informed Consent in Canada”   at http://borealcouncil.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/FPICReport-English-web.pdf 
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performance and to comprehensively integrate these three aspects into all their 
exploration programs. e3 Plus is a voluntary guideline designed to help explorers in their 
decision-making for exploration projects around the world.
42
 
The e3 Plus guidelines say that “the concept of free, prior, and informed consent 
(FPIC) provides a standard for interaction with indigenous communities.”43 As a member 
of the International Council on Mining and Metals, PDAC has subscribed to the consent 
requirement as articulated by that organization. 
Having reviewed five examples of the use of the consent standard, I turn to 
reasons why the standard makes sense for such a diverse group of institutions. 
4. Why Does It Make Sense for Financial Institutions and 
Industry to Require the Consent of Indigenous Peoples? 
Because consult is a lower standard, it would seem to make it easier to go forward 
with development projects, because the Indigenous party can never say “no.” Getting 
consent from the community would present another barrier for projects to overcome and 
would appear to make it more difficult for projects to go ahead. Why would the private 
sector be in favour of consent? 
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the costs of community conflict are 
significant and can result in serious impacts on companies, including suspensions and 
                                                          
42
 Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, “About Us,” at  
http://www.pdac.ca/about-pdac/about-pdac 
43
 Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, e3 Plus Principles and 
Guidance Notes, at 80, at http://www.pdac.ca/docs/default-source/e3-plus---
principles/e3-plus-principles-amp-guidance-notes---update-2014.pdf  
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closures of projects. The degree of opposition has resulted in violent confrontations 
across the globe, with thousands of people killed, injured, and raped, and huge losses to 
companies.
44
 For example, Newmont’s U.S.$4.8 billion Conga project in Peru faced 
massive opposition, including general strikes and road blockades. Opposing the mine has 
come with a heavy price for community members, with five farmers killed during one of 
the protests and many community leaders injured and beaten.  However, Newmont was 
forced to “voluntarily” suspend operation of the mine, with losses in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars.
45
 Another example is the Canadian company HudBay Minerals, 
which purchased a Guatemalan mine that had been riddled with conflict and 
assassinations throughout its history. The conflicts continued under HudBay’s ownership 
as it tried to evict Indigenous people from the mine site. During one confrontation, a 
community leader was murdered and others injured. The head of security of the mining 
company was charged and jailed. HudBay ended up selling the mine for CAD$176 
million in 2011, shortly after it was sued in Canada for the murder and for the alleged 
gang rapes of women that had occurred during an earlier eviction carried out by the 
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mine’s previous owners.46 HudBay had bought the mine three years before, for CAD$446 
million. 
In northern Ontario, a conflict between the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First 
Nation and a junior mining company called Platinex would have turned out better for all 
parties concerned had consent been the standard.
47
 In this case, the First Nation had been 
asking for a moratorium on mining activity in the area since 2001 and insisted that 
drilling not commence until there had been compliance with the First Nation’s 
Development Protocol, which included a referendum in the community. In August 2005, 
when Platinex announced its plan to begin exploration, the First Nation sent a strong 
letter of objection. In October 2005, Platinex began raising $1 million by selling shares – 
not mentioning the August letter of objection and, instead, telling investors that the First 
Nation had given verbal consent. In February 2006, Platinex sent in a drilling team 
without informing the First Nation. A confrontation occurred with members of the First 
Nation, and the drilling team left. Platinex then launched a law suit for $10 billion against 
the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug. This was approximately $10 million for every man, 
woman, and child on the reserve. The First Nation asked for an injunction to stop drilling. 
 In July 2006,
48
 Justice G.P. Smith ordered that drilling be halted in order to 
permit consultation and negotiations to take place. Over the next few months, the Ontario 
                                                          
46
 For a history of the El Estor mine, see Shin Imai, Bernadette Maheandiran, and 
Valerie Crystal, “Access to Justice and Corporate Accountability: A Legal Case Study of 
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 For a description of this case, see Rachel Ariss and John Cutfeet, Keeping the 
Land: Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug, Reconciliation and Canadian Law (Blackpoint, 
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Ministry of Mines and Northern Development joined in the negotiations and appeared at 
subsequent hearings to support Platinex. Various proposals were made to the First Nation 
with respect to employment, future consultation, a community fund, and fees for 
negotiation and litigation. The First Nation refused to consent and objected to the fact 
that Platinex and the ministry demanded that the First Nation agree to the drilling before 
they would enter into substantive consultations. A year passed and by 1 May 2007,
49
 the  
judge decided that the balance of convenience had shifted and drilling for phase one was 
allowed to proceed. 
At a hearing on 18 May 2007,
50
 the judge  ruled that an agreement reached 
between the ministry and Platinex, without the consent of the First Nation, was 
satisfactory and should be imposed on the First Nation. When the First Nation continued 
to block exploration activity, the judge found that the chief and the majority of the 
members of the elected council were guilty of contempt of court. At the urging of a 
lawyer for the Ontario government, who asked that the penalty be harsh enough ¨to make 
it hurt,” the judge sentenced them to six months in jail. The matter went up to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, and the chief and councillors were released after spending two months 
in jail.
51
 
Platinex was still determined to proceed, and in August 2009 another attempt was 
made to land a floatplane to begin exploration. The plane was prevented from landing by 
the chief. Platinex then began negotiating with the Ontario Ministry of Northern 
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50
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Development, Mines and Forestry and settled for a payment of $5 million from the 
government, far short of the $10 billion originally demanded.
52
 
Analysing this situation, we can see that all parties suffered: Platinex lost access 
to its property. Its investors lost – in December 2014, the stock was trading at one cent.53 
Ontario taxpayers had to pay $5 million, and probably more to cover legal fees, to 
compensate Platinex. The members of the First Nation spent time in jail.
54
 
The Platinex case is but one example of a generalized problem.  A Harvard 
University report on company-community conflicts, based on case studies from around 
the world, found that the absence of opportunity to consent to  projects that affect the 
community was one of the two major issues that precipitate conflict.
55
 
The reality of community opposition provides practical reasons to consider 
obtaining consent, but there is also a theoretical basis for favouring consent in the 
thinking of those in the Harvard Negotiation Project. For them, power imbalance is 
counterproductive. In the words of Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, “The 
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potential parties to a consensus-building effort cannot participate in a relationship in 
which one party holds all the power.”56 This imbalance may be a disincentive for weaker 
parties to engage in negotiation because they may believe they have more effective extra-
legal options or they may believe there is more built-in protection in the adjudicative 
system. If there is no true consensus, and the more powerful party imposes a solution, 
even if the solution makes some accommodation for the weaker party, the weaker party 
will not have made a commitment to the solution. This means that the solution will not be 
as durable nor proceed with the cooperation of the weaker party. In situations where there 
is conflict over a mine, it will mean continued conflict. 
 The problem with the consult standard is that the community feels powerless, 
because they are powerless. It is difficult for people to trust a process of discussion when 
they know that no matter what happens, the final decision is not in their hands. It is 
through recognition of the necessity of consent that the Indigenous community will have 
power that can be a balance to the superior economic power of the mining company and 
the superior political power of government. 
  
5. What Is the Difference between Consent and Veto? 
I have indicated above that Canadian courts have said that Indigenous people do 
not have a veto and that Canada raised objections to the consent provisions in the United 
Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples at the 2014 World Conference on Indigenous 
Peoples, saying that a veto .  would be incompatible with Canadian law. 
                                                          
56
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A. “Veto” at the International Level 
A group of First Nations attending the World Conference expressed outrage at 
Canada’s position and pointed out that the word “veto” does not appear in the UN 
document. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come of the Grand Council of the Crees stated 
bluntly, “The government has never explained what it means by ‘veto.’ Is a ‘veto’ 
absolute? If so, then a ‘veto’ isn’t the same thing as ‘consent.’57 James Anaya, United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, takes the same position 
as Coon Come. He says that there is no right to a veto if it means that Indigenous 
communities can reject any project whatsoever: 
 
When the Special Rapporteur affirms that Indigenous people do not enjoy a right 
to have a veto in the context of consultation processes, he refers to the proposition 
that there is absolute power to unilaterally prohibit or impede all proposals and 
decisions of the state that could affect them, based on whatever justification or no 
justification at all. In his view, such a proposition is not supportable. To speak of 
a right to a veto in that sense, in relation to matters that can be in the legitimate 
interests of not only the Indigenous party but also national society in general is 
not consistent with the standard of participatory consultation that is incorporated 
into international norms.
58
 
                                                          
57
 Jenny Uechi, “First Nation Groups Condemn Federal Government’s 
‘Indefensible Attack’ on Indigenous Rights at UN Meeting,” Vancouver Observer, 25 
September 2014, at http://www.vancouverobserver.com/news/first-nation-groups-
condemn-federal-governments-indefensible-attack-indigenous-rights-un. See also Roshan 
Danesh, “Rhetoric matters when discussing First Nations’ role in resource decisions” 
Globe and Mail (December 9, 2016) online: 
https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/rhetoric-matters-when-
discussing-first-nations-role-in-resource-decisions/article33293082/ 
58
 Declaración pública del Relator Especial sobre los derechos humanos y 
libertades fundamentales de los indígenas, James Anaya, sobre la “Ley del derecho a la 
consulta previa a los pueblos indígenas u originarios reconocido en el Convenio No. 169 
de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo” aprobada por el Congreso de la República 
del Perú, 7 de julio de 2010, punto 1 [Public Declaration of the Special Rapporteur on the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples on the “Law on the right 
to prior consultation of indigenous and original peoples recognized in ILO 169 of the 
International Labour Organization, 7 July 2010] [unofficial translation by author], at 
http://www.politicaspublicas.net/panel/re/nws/632-declaracion-consulta-peru.html. See 
   24 
 
Although Anaya does not think that there exists an absolute veto, he goes on to 
say that Indigenous communities can refuse to grant their consent when a project would 
have a significant impact. 
 
In those cases in which the impact of a proposal or initiative on the well-being 
and rights of an Indigenous people is significant, the consent of the Indigenous 
party, through an agreement, is not only the objective of consultation, but also a 
necessary precondition for carrying out the proposed measures.59 
At the international level, then, the debate is not over whether there is a veto or 
not but over the circumstances in which consent is required. The consent issue was 
addressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Pueblo Saramaka 
v Suriname.
60
 The Saramaka are descendants of escaped slaves and have lived in the 
rainforest since the seventeenth century. They carved out their own territory, which they 
were able to protect from intruders until the mid-twentieth century. At that time, the 
Government of Suriname began displacing the Saramaka for logging and mining. The 
Saramaka brought a complaint to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which 
released its decision on 28 November 2007. The Court referred to the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People to find that the Saramaka had the right to 
be consulted and to consent before mineral and forestry development in their territory. 
 
… the Court considers that, regarding large-scale development or investment 
projects that would have a major impact within Saramaka territory, the State has a 
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duty, not only to consult with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior, 
and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions.
61
 
It is fair to say that the precise parameters for identifying when consent is required 
are still in development. The Inter-American Court itself provides three iterations of the 
test. The above quote from the 2007 judgment mentions “large-scale development or 
investment projects” that would have a “major impact within Saramaka territory.” Three 
paragraphs later in the judgment, the court describes the required impact as “a profound 
impact on the property rights of the members of the Saramaka people to a large part of 
their territory.”62 In an Interpretive Judgment from 2008, the Court says that consent is 
necessary when the impact “could affect the integrity of the Saramaka people’s lands and 
natural resources.”63 
UNDRIP provides specific examples of instances when consent is required from 
Indigenous peoples: relocation from their lands and territories;
64
 the taking of their 
cultural, intellectual, religious, or spiritual property;
65
 the taking of “lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used”;66 and the 
storage of hazardous materials on Indigenous lands.
67
 
The International Financial Corporation’s Performance Standard 7 sets out four 
similar circumstances to trigger free prior informed consent: adverse impacts on lands 
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and natural resources that are subject to traditional ownership or customary use;
68
 
relocation from communally held lands;
69
 significant project impacts on critical cultural 
heritage;
70
 use of cultural heritage, including knowledge, innovations, and practices, for 
commercial purposes.
71
 
In 2012, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, an advisory 
body to the United Nations Human Rights Council, provided a more comprehensive 
description: 
 
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires that the free, prior 
and informed consent of indigenous peoples be obtained in matters of 
fundamental importance to their rights, survival, dignity and well-being. In 
assessing whether a matter is of importance to the indigenous peoples concerned, 
relevant factors include the perspective and priorities of the indigenous peoples 
concerned, the nature of the matter or proposed activity and its potential impact 
on the indigenous peoples concerned, taking into account, inter alia, the 
cumulative effects of previous encroachments or activities and historical 
inequities faced by the indigenous peoples concerned.
72
 
We can see that a number of formulations for the circumstances when consent is 
required are being developed at the international level. I do not intend to parse the 
differences in wording nor analyse the specific circumstances that have been highlighted, 
as in this chapter, I focus more on the larger trajectory of the need to obtain consent. 
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 B. Canadian Courts and Consent in Aboriginal Title Cases 
We can now turn to decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, where the focus 
has been on “infringe and justify” (Sparrow) and the duty to consult and accommodate 
(Haida Nation) The cases below discuss Aboriginal title claims in situations where there 
are no treaties. I apply these principles to the treaty context in part seven. 
In Delgamuukw v British Columbia,
73
 the Supreme Court of Canada approached 
the concept of consent in the context of Aboriginal title. Chief Justice Lamer noted that 
arising from the Crown’s fiduciary duty towards Aboriginal peoples, “[t]here is always a 
duty of consultation.” He further noted, 
 
The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary within the 
circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or relatively 
minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be 
taken with respect to lands held pursuant to aboriginal title … In most cases, it 
will be significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even require 
the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting 
and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands.(emphasis added)
74
 
So Delgamuuk tentatively identifies a sphere of activity where consent is required. 
However, this case also provides limits on how the First Nation uses Aboriginal title 
lands because of the special bond that exists between the nation and the land: 
 
… if occupation is established with reference to the use of the land as a hunting 
ground, then the group that successfully claims aboriginal title to that land may 
not use it in such a fashion as to destroy its value for such a use (e.g., by strip 
mining it). Similarly, if a group claims a special bond with the land because of its 
ceremonial or cultural significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to 
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destroy that relationship (e.g. by developing it in such a way that the bond is 
destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a parking lot).75 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Xeni Gwet’in v 
British Columbia.
76
 The Court found that the Tsilhqot’in First Nation had Aboriginal title 
over 1,750 square kilometres (675 square miles) of land in British Columbia, which gave 
them the right to decide how the land would be used; the right of enjoyment and 
occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of 
the land; and the right to proactively use and manage the land.
77
 As a general proposition, 
then, consent of the First Nation would be necessary for government or a company to use 
Aboriginal title land. However, in a somewhat puzzling move, the Court decided the 
Crown could dispense with consent if the land was needed for agriculture, mining, 
lumbering, building of infrastructure, or settlement. In order to override the lack of 
consent, the Crown would have to comply with the Sparrow test and show, among other 
things, that there was a “compelling and substantial” purpose for dispensing with consent 
and that the Crown had consulted with the First Nation.
78
 However, in another puzzling 
move, although the Crown could override lack of consent from the Tsilhqot’in, it could 
not do so if it would “substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the 
land.”79  
To summarize where we are so far, we see that Xeni Gwet’in established that the 
Tsilhqot’in have Aboriginal title and that consent is necessary for using their lands, but 
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that the requirement for consent could not necessarily prevent agriculture, mining, 
lumbering, building of infrastructure, or settlement, because the Crown could override the 
lack of consent using the Sparrow test. However, the Crown override does not apply to 
projects that would deprive future generations of the benefit of the land, so that the 
Crown’s authority has an outer limit. Does this mean that the Tsilhqot’in themselves can 
consent to uses that would deprive future generations of the use of the land? Apparently 
not. Although the Court finds that the Tsilhqot’in can put their lands to use in “modern 
ways,” the Tsilhqot’ins’ land cannot “be developed or misused in a way that would 
substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land.”80 Consequently, it 
appears that Aboriginal title provides absolute protection of the land for future 
generations, that cannot be taken away by the Crown using the Sparrow test, nor even by 
the consent of the First Nation itself.   This is starting to look like a Russian doll, with 
exceptions buried within exceptions.  
This Canadian framework is different from the international approach, which 
protects the sphere of detrimental impact by requiring free, prior, and informed consent 
by Indigenous people. The international framework, as it has developed so far, has not 
focused on state power to override the lack of consent by an Indigenous group, but rather 
has looked at situations where consent is required, and where it is not required.   
Both the international and Canadian approaches recognize that there is something 
special about the link between the land and Indigenous people that needs to be protected. 
However, the Canadian approach to date fails to provide sufficient agency and 
recognition to the role of the Indigenous group. The Canadian approach is Crown-centric 
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and primarily concerned with Crown conduct in relation to Indigenous people. This is 
obvious from the questions in the Sparrow test: Is the Crown infringing Aboriginal 
rights? Is the Crown consulting? Is the Crown acting honourably? The international 
consent standard, on the other hand, adds a focus on the Indigenous group as well. States 
have obligations to consult and ensure that there is free, prior, informed consent, and this 
requirement puts Indigenous groups at the centre of the process in a way that the Sparrow  
infringe-and-justify test or Haida Nation’s consult and accommodate test   does not. 
In the next section, I will provide some preliminary ideas on how the consent 
standard could be applied to implement treaties in Canada. 
6. Court Adoption of Best Practices 
Standards 
While private-sector corporate social responsibility initiatives have helped to 
bring discussions on consent into the mainstream, these voluntary initiatives generally do 
not provide any form of redress for individual complaints, and are unenforceable against 
the companies themselves. As such, in cases where there is an allegation of a breach by 
one of the signing institutions, the complainant is left with little or no recourse. 
For instance, the Equator Principles simply oblige member financial institutions 
to require any company with whom they deal to establish a grievance mechanism 
designed to receive and facilitate resolution of concerns about a project’s environmental 
and social performance within the company or project itself. However, the Equator 
Principles do not impose a duty on its members to adopt grievance mechanisms of their 
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own. Consequently, if someone feels that a member bank has lent money for a project 
that does not have Indigenous consent, there is no avenue for complaining to the bank or 
the Equator Principles organization.
81
 
There are similar problems with the other standards. The e3 Plus guidelines from 
the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada are not mandatory for members, 
and there is no way to determine which, if any, companies have adopted them. The 
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) makes its guidelines mandatory to 
its members, but there is no way of complaining if there is a breach. The ICMM website 
states that if the ICMM office receives a complaint, it will be referred directly to the 
company; the ICMM itself does not address or mediate issues between a third party and a 
member.
82
 The Boreal Leadership Council developed its guidelines on free, prior, 
informed consent to “encourage and contribute to a solutions-based dialogue,”83 but the 
council does not police adherence to the guidelines. Similarly, the Secretariat on the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity does not police implementation of its Akwé: Kon 
Guidelines. 
Of the organizations whose performance standards are studied in this chapter, 
only the International Finance Corporation is equipped with a grievance mechanism: the 
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), an independent recourse mechanism for 
projects supported by the private-sector agencies of the World Bank Group. Indigenous 
groups can make a direct complaint to this agency rather than the company against whom 
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they are making the complaint. However, the CAO merely “responds to complaints from 
project-affected communities” by “help[ing] parties identify alternatives for resolving the 
issues of concern.” The CAO has explicitly stated that it does not “impose solutions or 
find fault,”84 so remedies to individuals or enforcement against the company are not 
within its mandate.
85
 
While the consent standards described above do not provide any direct remedies 
to Indigenous communities, they do give an indication of what some bodies consider to 
be “best practices” for the industry. The actions of particular government or industry 
players can be judged against the best practices suggested for the industry in judicial 
proceedings. 
For example, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity are not directly binding on anyone, but the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights took note of the guidelines as a standard for assessing the behaviour of the 
Government of Suriname in the consultation process in the Saramaka case. The Court 
called the Guidelines “[o]ne of the most comprehensive and used standards for 
[Environmental and Social Impact Assessments] in the context of indigenous and tribal 
Peoples.”86 Other bodies have referenced, recognized or adopted the Akwé: Kon Guidelines 
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as well, including the Kenya Industrial Property Institute,87 the UK National Contact 
Point for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,88 the 
Government of Finland89 and the Supreme Court of India.90 
In Ontario, decisions in the two cases referred to the e3 Plus Aboriginal 
engagement guidelines published by the Prospectors and Developers Association of 
Canada, although, as I have already indicated, these guidelines are voluntary and even 
PDAC members are not obliged to follow them. Nonetheless, two courts in Ontario have 
used them as a touchstone for company behaviour. In Wahgoshig First Nation v Solid 
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Gold Resources Corp,
91
 Solid Gold, a small exploratory company headquartered in 
Sudbury, refused to consult with the Wahgoshig First Nation, in spite of its being advised 
to do so by the Ontario government. When Solid Gold attempted to continue exploring, 
the First Nation took the matter to court. In granting an injunction against further 
exploration, Justice Carole Brown wrote, “[I]t … appears that Solid Gold has failed to 
meet industry standards for responsible exploration as set forth by the Prospectors and 
Developers Association of Canada with respect to First Nations engagement.”92 
Another example is the Platinex Inc. v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First 
Nation described above.
93
 Justice G.P. Smith, the judge in this case, noted that Platinex 
did not follow the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada’s Best Practices 
Exploration and Environmental Excellence Standards, which state that before drilling is 
to commence on lands under an Aboriginal claim, the drilling company should sign a 
memorandum of understanding.
94
 This was one of the factors that led the judge to 
suspend drilling until consultations had taken place. 
We see here that some of these voluntary standards have been given life in both 
international and domestic courts. In the next section I argue that the consent standard 
from non-binding international and domestic instruments should inform judicial thinking. 
Why should courts shy away from requiring best practices for resource extraction on 
Indigenous lands? 
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7. Application of Consent Standard to Numbered 
Treaties 
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, I am going to sketch out some 
preliminary thoughts on a legal framework for consent, building on existing case law. 
The two  elements of the numbered treaties that are relevant to this discussion are the 
clause dealing with the “surrendering” of traditional territories; and the hunting and 
fishing “lands taken up” clause.  The treaties also created   reserves, which are small 
pieces of land, perhaps fifty square kilometres (twenty square miles), which are under a 
separate Indian Act legal regime that does not apply here. The lands that are the subject 
of the  analysis in this chapter are large tracts that are covered by the treaty but are 
outside of the reserves. I refer to these as “treaty lands.” The fact pattern I have proposed 
to explore the legal framework is for extractive industry access to treaty lands (that is, off 
reserve), not covered by a land claims agreement, not patented (that is, Crown lands), in a 
rural area. 
There are three building blocks to my analysis. 
(i) Courts have found that there is an Indian interest in treaty lands in spite of the 
“surrender clause” and that the Crown has neither unilateral nor unlimited 
power to take up lands for extractive industry, in spite of the “lands taken up 
clause.” There is a duty to consult and accommodate for any taking up of 
lands, but in cases where the taking up will impact the meaningful right to 
harvest, the Crown must justify its actions using the Sparrow test.  
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(ii) I argue that there should be negotiations to identify how much land is needed 
to maintain a meaningful right to harvest. Until there are such negotiations,  
the courts need to provide a forum for identifying the point in time when the 
right is threatened.   
(iii) The Mikisew Cree case, discussed in part two, dealt with the “taking up” of 
lands and said that “compelling and substantial” purposes could justify 
taking away the meaningful right to harvest. I argue that Indigenous consent 
should now be added to the justification test for future “taking up” of lands.    
A. The Surrender Clause and Continuing Indigenous Interest in 
Traditional Lands 
The fact that the written versions of “numbered treaties” say that the land was 
“surrendered” to the Crown raises the question of the nature of the Indian interest on 
lands that are covered by the treaty but are outside of the reserves. 
The “surrender” clause in Treaty No. 8, for example, reads like an absolute 
transfer of title from First Nations to the Crown. 
 
… the said Indians DO HEREBY CEDE, RELEASE, SURRENDER AND 
YIELD UP to the Government of the Dominion of Canada, for Her Majesty the 
Queen and Her successors for ever, all their rights, titles and privileges 
whatsoever, to the lands included within the following limits … 95 
First Nations say that they never considered the treaties to be real estate deals – 
rather, they were meant to create relationships with the Crown. There is plenty of 
evidence that in various negotiations, the Indians were told that their livelihoods would 
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not change. In his chapter of this book, Michael Coyle explains the problems arising from 
the different understandings of the treaties. Although there is some judicial support for 
questioning the validity of the surrender clause as it is set out in the written version of the 
treaty,
96
 most courts assume that the surrender is valid, and that rights to the land have 
been alienated. If the surrender is valid, can consent from Indigenous groups be required 
for the use of land that belongs to the Crown? 
For our purposes, I do not think that we need to answer the question of who 
“owns” the land. Whether or not there was a total surrender of the land, it is not disputed 
that treaty First Nations have an interest in their traditional lands arising from their 
traditional use and occupancy of the land. The right to continue to use the land for 
harvesting purposes is written into the treaty through the “lands taken up” clause. As 
indicated earlier in this chapter, this clause, if read literally, gives the Crown unlimited 
unilateral authority to take up lands until there is nothing left for the harvesting activities. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, in Mikisew Cree   recognized that the Crown’s 
authority was not unlimited – the First Nation needs enough land to “meaningfully” 
exercise harvesting rights. Nor could the Crown exercise its authority unilaterally, as the 
Court imposed a requirement to consult and accommodate the First Nation before taking 
up the lands. 
Canadian law is consistent with the thinking on the nature of Indigenous interest 
in land at the international level. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples refers to “lands, territories and resources which they have 
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traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.”97 The International Finance 
Corporation Performance Standard 7, which is incorporated into both the Equator 
Principles and the International Council on Mining and Metals standards, specifically 
provides for the requirement of consent on lands that are “traditionally owned or under 
customary use.” Legal title or demarcation is not necessary: 
 
Indigenous peoples are often closely tied to their lands and related natural resources. 
Frequently, these lands are traditionally owned or under customary use. While 
Indigenous peoples may not possess legal title to these lands as defined by national 
law, their use of these lands, including seasonal or cyclical use, for their livelihoods, 
or cultural, ceremonial, and spiritual purposes that define their identity and 
community, can often be substantiated and documented.
98
 
B. The Lack of a Forum to Discuss the “Meaningful Right to 
Harvest”   
As we have seen, the Crown is required to consult on, but not justify, taking up 
lands until the point where there is no longer enough land to “meaningfully” exercise 
harvesting rights. One of the practical challenges, then, is trying to decide when that point 
in time is reached. How do we know when a particular project will send us off the edge? 
Is anyone keeping track? 
Individual decisions based on the rights of individuals to hunt or fish, or judicial 
review of the adequacy of consultations in individual project proposals, do not provide 
the overview necessary for decision-making bodies to determine whether the taking up of 
land in a particular treaty area is approaching the point in time when the “meaningful 
right” disappears. For example, in 2004, the Saulteau First Nations argued that there 
                                                          
97
 UNDRIP, supra note 20, Article 28.2, emphasis added. 
98
 IFC, supra note 26 para 13, emphasis added. 
   39 
 
needed to be a study of the cumulative impacts of development because “if approvals are 
not considered broadly in context, small incremental infringements may threaten treaty 
rights by ‘death by a thousand cuts.’99 This anxiety is not misplaced, because almost 
every square centimeter of land in Canada is subject to some type of non-Indigenous 
interest, ranging from mining concessions and water rights for private companies to 
rights of way for recreational snowmobilers. Furthermore, there is legislation in the 
provinces that will permit an automatic “taking up” of treaty lands with no scrutiny or 
notice whatsoever. For example, the free-entry system for mines in British Columbia 
allows company to stake claims without obtaining any prior approval from 
government,
100
 and the Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld provincial legislation that 
dedicates highways for public use by the passage of time, without requiring any decision 
on anyone’s part.101 
In spite of these continual creeping encroachments, there is at present no 
systematic process for gathering information on what rights need to be “meaningfully” 
protected or how much land needs to be set aside to protect those rights. Ideally, there 
would be a political negotiation process  to address this problem.  In an article in 2001, I 
argued that the treaty lands problem can be resolved only through a process that will set 
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aside enough lands to preserve the meaningful right to hunt, fish, and trap.
102
 Such 
comprehensive negotiations on treaties as a whole were recommended by the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples as far back as in 1985,
103
 and by Michael Coyle in his 
chapter in this book. Without a political framework, however, matters end up in court, 
and the courts are struggling.  
 Four cases illustrate how difficult it is to find an appropriate judicial forum to 
discuss the meaningful right to harvest and operationalize the test in Mikisew Cree. 
In the first case, Buffalo River Dene Nation v Saskatchewan (Minister of Energy 
and Resources),
104
 the question of timing for raising an objection to exploration is the 
issue.  In this case, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that consultation was not 
required before the issuing of an exploration permit, because there would be no actual 
impact until a second permit for exploitation was issued. The court reasoned as follows: 
 
To trigger [the duty to consult], actual foreseeable adverse impacts 
on an identified treaty or Aboriginal right or claim must flow from the 
impugned Crown conduct. While the test [for consultation] admits 
possible adverse impacts, there must be a direct link between the adverse 
impacts and the impugned Crown conduct. If adverse impacts are not 
possible until after a later-in-time, independent decision, then it is that 
later decision that triggers the duty to consult.
105
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However, the court failed to appreciate that the exploration stage is not benign. It 
sets in motion a set of expectations and financial relationships. The court itself notes that 
the exploration companies must raise money from investors. These investors should 
know what interests the First Nations will assert if exploitation begins. It is not fair to 
allow exploration companies to keep investors in the dark. If a First Nation has a strong 
position against development of resources on a particular part of their territory, investors 
should know before speculating on the exploration company. Unfortunately, the Buffalo 
River Dene Nation case does nothing but punt the problem into the future, where the 
Crown, First Nation and mining company will find themselves deadlocked in the same 
way that the parties in Platinex were deadlocked: the mining company and investors have 
made financial commitments and need to move ahead with the project; the First Nation 
continues to block access to its land; and the Crown must buy themselves out of a 
political bind using public funds. It is a lose-lose-lose proposition.  
The second case deals with the process appropriate for raising the issue of the 
meaningful right to harvest.  In Yahey v British Columbia,
106
 the Blueberry River First 
Nations (BRFN), which are protected by Treaty No. 8, commissioned a study that 
showed development in their traditional territory has resulted in two-thirds of their 
territory being used for industry or located within 250 metres of an industrial location. At 
this rate, by 2060 there would be no land left for hunting and fishing activities guaranteed 
by the treaty. The First Nations asked for an injunction on the sale of certain timber 
licences. The court denied the injunction on the basis that stopping the particular timber 
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licences would only affect a small portion of the treaty territory, and that the First Nation 
should seek a general moratorium on all development in the area. 
 
BRFN may be able to persuade the court that a more general and wide-
ranging hold on industrial activity is needed to protect its treaty rights until 
trial. However, if the court is to consider such a far-reaching order, it 
should be on an application that frankly seeks that result and allows the 
court to fully appreciate the implications and effects of what it is being 
asked to do. The public interest will not be served by dealing with the 
matters are dealt with on a piecemeal, project-by-project basis.107 
Prophet River First Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Environment)
108
 raises 
the issue of which bodies are obliged to consider whether the meaningful right to harvest 
is in play. Four Treaty No. 8 First Nations challenged the approval of an environmental 
assessment for a dam on the Peace River that would have created a reservoir of 9,330 
hectares. The First Nation argued that development in the Peace River basin would take 
away the meaningful right to hunt and therefore, infringe the rights in the treaty. The 
British Columbia Supreme Court decided that the ministers, in approving the 
environmental assessment, did not have to take into consideration whether the impact on 
treaty lands would take away the meaningful right to hunt. Rather, the only obligation 
was to ensure that there was deep consultation. The court suggested that the larger issues 
on treaty infringement needed to be raised in an action that would address the issue for 
the whole territory. 
The problem with the “piecemeal” approach for First Nations is that each 
development, taken in isolation, will not likely constitute treaty infringement. But if First 
Nations cannot raise these issues in specific cases, they will be left to do what the judge 
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suggests – initiate actions for moratoria on all development in treaty territories. One 
could imagine that courts would be hard pressed to impose such wide-ranging moratoria 
on development, and one would anticipate a significant backlash from the non-Native 
population.  No such case has ever succeeded in Canada.
109
 
In the fourth case that I want to highlight here, the issue was whether consultation 
was enough to override treaty rights.   In Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation v Canada 
(Minister of the Environment).
110
   an environmental panel found that the Shell Canada 
Energy Jackpine Mine Expansion in northern Alberta would have extensive irreversible 
adverse impacts on the land and culture of the First Nation covered by Treaty No. 8. 
Nonetheless, the governments decided to proceed with the project after a six-year study 
that included “deep consultation” with the First Nation. To the extent that  this case 
suggests that a project which will have irreversible impacts on treaty rights can be 
countenanced simply because there has been “deep consultation” I would suggest the 
court is applying the wrong test. When  there is an infringement of a treaty right, as 
appears to be the case here, whether the consultation is adequate is the wrong test. It 
seems to me that in this case, we are dealing not with a consultation problem but, rather, 
with a problem relating to the infringement of the treaty that would have required the 
application of the Sparrow test. 
At the risk of repeating myself, let me explain where I think that courts have taken 
us.    First, Buffalo River Dene Nation case suggests that First Nations cannot object if the 
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exploratory activity does not have an impact on the First Nation. The First Nation must 
wait until the resource extraction company and its investors have made financial 
commitments to the project and plan to exploit the resource. Second, the Yahey case 
makes it impossible to raise the larger issues relating to a meaningful right to hunt in an 
injunction for specific licences, and Prophet River suggests that the issue cannot be 
addressed in the environmental assessment process. Third, the Athabasca Chipewyan 
First Nation case shows that even if the First Nation were able to show treaty 
infringement, deep consultation would be enough to permit the project to go ahead. So 
none of these cases permit a discussion of the big picture relating to the meaningful right 
to harvest. The only option  suggested by the courts is to bring a court case to stop all 
development on their treaty lands. As I have already indicated, this is not a realistic 
proposition, and judges themselves would likely be taken aback should such a claim ever 
be made. Certainly, forcing First Nations to make such broad claims would not facilitate 
reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, but rather invite a harsh 
backlash.  
If these four  cases articulate the present law, the courts have closed off a 
substantive consideration of whether the “meaningful right” described in Mikisew Cree 
has been infringed. These cases have not attempted to construct a viable framework for 
assessing when the “meaningful right” to hunt has disappeared. It is clear that a political 
process is needed to resolve these issues, but is there anything that courts could be doing 
differently until there are broad negotiations on treaty lands?  In my view, courts can 
make an important contribution.  
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C. Introducing Consent into the Sparrow Test 
I suggest that courts should look at development on treaty lands, not as issues 
relating to consultation  but as issues relating to treaty infringement. In other words, new  
licences for resource extraction would not be subject to the  consultation and 
accommodation test set out in Haida Nation  but, rather,  the infringement  and 
justification test set out in Sparrow and Mikisew Cree.  By applying the Sparrow test, the 
courts would look for the Crown to do more than consult. The Crown would have to 
justify the objectives of the legislation and show that it acted honourably in infringing 
treaty rights.    It is here that the consent standard could be applied. As mentioned above, 
the Supreme Court of Canada suggested in 1997 in  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 
that consent may be necessary where the proposed development would infringe 
harvesting rights. While courts have not expanded on the concept of consent, I have 
argued above that international standards and industry practice have overtaken judicial 
and governmental reluctance to recognize the consent standard.  So part of the 
justification would involve determining whether the infringement was significant enough 
to require consent.  
 If the default position were that any resource exploration on treaty lands could 
potentially take away the meaningful right to harvest, and thereby infringe treaty rights, 
then the Crown would be forced to enter discussions early with the First Nation to obtain 
their consent. It may be that some accommodation could be reached for exploratory 
activities and eventual exploitation. But if there were no accommodation possible, then 
the mining company and its investors will know before they make irrevocable financial 
commitments.  
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 Does this mean that First Nations would have a “veto” on all resource extraction 
on their lands? Under the present, law, the answer would be “no” because courts will 
decide, on a case by case basis whether the Crown has justified the infringement of the 
treaty right and whether consent was obtained. Courts must do this analysis sooner or 
later in any case, and it is manifestly better to face the problem earlier, rather than later 
when the parties have more at stake and the losses will be more impactful. 
 D. Adoption of the Consent  Standard Should Not be Difficult 
I began by describing the three elements of the original legal framework for the 
numbered treaties: recognition of an Indigenous collectivity; recognition of an interest of 
the collectivity in their lands; and recognition of the necessity of obtaining consent to 
access those lands. 
After a dark century, where neither government nor courts recognized any of the 
three elements of the framework, reconstruction began towards the end of the twentieth 
century. Today, almost two decades into the twenty-first century, recognition of 
Indigenous collectivities and their interest in their lands is well settled. However, 
Canadian courts have not yet explicitly started developing a law around consent. Instead, 
courts in Canada have been focusing on consultation and accommodation and 
justification of infringement embedded in an overall lack of a “veto” by Indigenous 
people. I argue in part five that an advantage of the consent standard being developed 
internationally is that it puts Indigenous people at the centre of the decision on land in a 
way that the infringe-and-justify framework does not. In this part, I argue that we are on 
the precipice of losing the meaningful right to harvest,  and that there is a legal and moral 
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imperative to require consent of First Nations for further taking up of lands. I also point 
out that in Delgumuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada contemplated the necessity of 
consent when hunting, fishing, and trapping rights would be taken away. 
But my views are also informed by the fact that consent is already the “best 
practice” for the extractive industries. International state-sponsored institutions such as 
the United Nations, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights, and the International Finance Corporation as well private-
sector bodies such as the Equator Principles, the International Council on Mining and 
Metals, and the Boreal Leadership Council have already adopted the consent standard. 
The adoption of this standard makes sense both practical and theoretical sense.  For the 
practical utility of the standard, I have given the examples of the high cost of conflict in 
the multi-billion-dollar Conga project in Peru, now suspended by Newmont, and in 
Canada, the halting of Platinex’s exploratory activities on the treaty lands of the 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug. For the theoretical advantage of respecting the consent 
standard, I have pointed to negotiating theory, which suggests that the greater equality of 
bargaining power that comes with the recognition of the necessity of consent will more 
likely lead to better and more durable outcomes. 
In Canada, recognizing consent is more a conceptual barrier for governments and 
the courts than an actual practical concern. Industry practice has largely moved to the 
consent standard in the form of Impact Benefit Agreements (IBAs) – agreements that are 
negotiated directly between companies and Indigenous communities. In return for a 
promise from the community not to oppose the project, the company will provide 
monetary benefits, some training, and perhaps some form of environmental 
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monitoring.
111
 In spite of some highly publicized conflicts, like that of the 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib, the majority of projects in Canada are able to proceed after IBAs 
have been signed. 
Government, as well, has largely moved to seeking agreements with First Nations 
on large land claims. The federal and provincial governments were first forced into 
negotiations with the Cree and Inuit of Quebec in 1973, when an ambitious hydroelectric 
project was temporarily halted by a Quebec court that recognized an Aboriginal interest 
in land.
112
 Although the initial case was overturned a few days later,
113
 the governments 
and the Indigenous parties signed the first modern treaty in 1977.
114
 Since then there have 
been about a dozen other treaties signed in British Columbia, the Yukon, the Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut, and Labrador, covering, in total, 40 per cent of Canada’s lands, 
waters, and resources.
115
 In other words, the Crown has embarked on a modern treaty-
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making exercise that, like the historic treaties, recognizes the existence of an Indigenous 
collectivity, recognizes their interest in their land, and recognizes the necessity of 
obtaining consent to access their territory. 
Until the Crown institutes comprehensive negotiations on treaty lands, the issues 
relating to a meaningful right to harvest will continue to be presented in the courtroom. 
At the present time, courts have not developed a framework nor a forum for discussing 
this issue. It cannot be raised before the exploration phase because there are not impacts. 
It cannot be raised during the assessment phase or the exploration phase because only the 
impacts of the specific project can be considered. And even if treaty infringement is 
proved, deep consultation is sufficient to allow the project to proceed.   
I argue that courts can find a way out of this morass using the existing framework 
developed in Sparrow and recognizing that new resource extraction activities on treaty 
lands could result in treaty infringement. In analyzing justification for the Crown 
conduct, courts could start developing the concept of consent first mentioned by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. By doing this, courts will 
encourage the Crown to negotiate early and perhaps push the Crown to develop a broad 
process for setting aside treaty lands to fulfill the treaty promises.  
8. Concluding Thoughts 
Having argued for the adoption of the consent standard, I realize that these 
preliminary ideas cannot be implemented without a great deal of refinement. I will point 
out four important policy issues that need further consideration. 
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First, the contemporary status of the land may have an impact on the 
implementation of the consent standard. Unoccupied Crown land would be relatively 
straightforward to bring into the consent framework, but lands that have already been 
“taken up” for extractive industries, or lands that have already been alienated to third 
parties, would raise complicated discussions on  how to addressnon-Indigenous interests.   
Second, the precise circumstances that would trigger the necessity of consent 
would have to be worked out in the Canadian context. Opinion at the international level 
suggests that consent would not have to be sought on every decision that could affect 
Indigenous land interests. However, the articulation of what “significant” impact would 
attract the requirement for consent should be developed through the consideration of 
specific cases. 
Third, there would have to be some thought put into what “hunting, fishing, and 
trapping” means in the context of the land as a source of livelihood today. Are these 
words to be read narrowly, to encompass only subsistence harvesting activities? In my 
2001 article, I argued that the harvesting rights recognized in treaties should not be seen 
as rights of individual Indians, but rather as a guarantee of collective survival.
116
 That is, 
the Crown must ensure that there are sufficient resources on treaty lands to provide for 
the survival of the collective as a whole. Although the words in the treaty seem to be 
limited to individual rights to harvest from the land, a more historically accurate reading 
would see that the harvesting rights were a recognition that the Indigenous parties relied 
on the land for their economic survival. This economic survival approach is supported in 
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the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v Marshall.117 In this case Donald 
Marshall, a Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia, was acquitted of fishing and selling eels without a 
licence. The Court interpreted a 1760 treaty, which did not mention fishing at all but had 
a clause providing for commercial relations between the British and the Mi’kmaq. As 
there was evidence that fish were traded at the time of the treaty, the Court found that the 
trading clause meant to protect “access to the things that were to be traded.” In other 
words, the Court took into account the larger economic context of the Indigenous relation 
to the land. 
Fourth, would the consent standard permit a First Nation to authorize hazardous 
activities, such as nuclear waste dump on its lands? In other words, does the ability to 
prevent deleterious activity also provide the Indigenous group an ability to authorize 
activity that would have a significant impact on its lands? I would say “no,” because the 
ability of a First Nation to authorize activities on its lands involves governance issues that 
are addressed in the self-government and land claims agreements mentioned above.
118
 
The consent standard does not itself address governance issues. It has been applied at the 
international level as a shield against detrimental extractive projects on Indigenous lands, 
not as a sword that can give authority to Indigenous groups. Both Delgamuukw and Xeni 
Gwet’in say that Indigenous people may not permit uses on their lands that would be 
inconsistent with the foundation of the Indigenous connection to the land and the interests 
of future generations. It seems to me, then, that in Canada, adopting the free, prior, 
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informed consent standard will not open the way for unregulated deleterious uses of 
Indigenous lands. 
If there were treaty negotiations, these four questions would be an important part 
of the discussions. Absent such negotiations, the issues will be addressed in the 
courtroom. At the present time, courts in Canada are lagging behind international and 
private industry standards, as well as practice on the ground. Rather than focusing on the 
fact that Indigenous parties do not have a veto, courts should focus on the development of 
the concept of consent. 
